This study examines the impact of board characteristics and ownership structure on earnings management (EM) practices by acquirers in post-merger scenarios, using firm-level data from India between 2008 and 2020. Employing a fixed-effects model, the analysis finds that EM is significantly influenced by CEO duality, board size, and the nature of the acquisition. Acquirers with dual-role CEOs and larger boards (≥9 members) tend to engage more in EM, particularly in controlling stake acquisitions. Additionally, the presence of overcommitted (“busy”) directors and excessive committee memberships correlates with higher EM. However, active board participation in committees helps mitigate these effects. In non-controlling acquisitions, CEO duality appears to reduce EM, suggesting that consolidated leadership may empower decision-making to counter opportunistic behavior from target firm owners. The study also observes that institutional shareholders may contribute to EM by pressuring management for better financial results. These findings have implications for regulators, auditors, and shareholders, providing early indicators of EM risk and supporting more robust governance and monitoring frameworks in M&A contexts. The study contributes to the literature by linking post-acquisition agency costs with EM behavior and highlighting governance structures that influence these dynamics.