This study explores how employee interests influence corporate pension governance under a stakeholder-oriented model. Using unique data from Japanese defined benefit (DB) plan sponsors, we examine firms' adoption of Employee Retirement Benefit Trusts (ERBTs) and their implications for shareholder-employee risk-shifting behavior. We find that ERBT adoption is associated with reduced pension-related risk-taking—manifested in more conservative funding strategies and less reliance on R&D and financial leverage as indirect substitutes for pension contributions. Our results suggest that older employees and those with longer tenure tend to favor ERBT adoption, prioritizing pension security over growth-oriented strategies. Conversely, unionized younger employees often resist ERBTs, likely due to concerns about foregone growth opportunities. Firms with strong shareholder governance are less likely to adopt ERBTs, while those with entrenchment protections are more inclined to do so. These findings underscore the complex trade-offs between employee interests, managerial discretion, and shareholder value in long-term pension management.